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RECENT ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS-1964* 
Milton Handlert 
I. CONSIGNMENT SELLING AND THE .ANTITRUST LAws 
EVER since the passage of the Sherman Act, the courts have con-sistently refused to permit the requirements of antitrust to be 
circumvented by the easy expedient of dressing a sale in the vest-
ments of a sham agency agreement. In Dr. Miles Medical,1 where the 
Supreme Court first held vertical price fixing unlawful, the seller and 
buyer denominated their agreement as an "agency," but the Court 
properly concluded that it was, in fact, a sale. Likewise, in Standard-
Magrane,2 the first occasion on which the Court considered section 
3 of the Clayton Act, the seller purported to appoint his customers 
as agents. Again, the Court cut through to the heart of the trans-
action and found that, despite its formal trappings, it was not a 
real agency. 
In the General Electric case,8 however, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, 
for a unanimous Court, found that the consignment method of 
merchandising there challenged was a true and not a colorable 
agency and, accordingly, upheld the consignor's right to set the 
price at which the consigned goods might be sold to the ultimate 
consumer. This result was reached despite the fact that the con-
signor had established the resale price, had possessed great economic 
power,4 had offered its dealers no alternative distribution arrange-
ment, and had encompassed within a vast nationwide consignment 
network as many as four hundred wholesalers and 21 thousand or 
more retailers/; all of whom were independent businessmen.6 And, 
• This article is based upon a lecture before the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New Y(?rk on June 18, 1964. The lecture, as delivered, included a section on 
the recent decisions in Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). That section is being 
separately published in the November 1964 issue of the Columbia Law Review as part 
of a symposium exploring the implications and effects of these novel rulings. 
I am grateful to Michael Malina, Richard J. Medalie, and Leonard Orland for their 
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this paper. 
t Professor of Law, Columbia University. Member, New York Bar.-Ed. 
I. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park 8c Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
2. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922). 
l!. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
4. General Electric alone had 69% of the electric light business in 1921; together 
with Westinghouse and its other licensees, General Electric accounted for 93%. Id. 
at 481. 
5. Id. at 483. 
6. See id. at 484-85. 
[ 59] 
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the Court went out of its way to make clear that its ruling applied 
to unpatented as well as patented goods.7 Whatever reservations may 
have existed as to the correctness of the Court's determination in 
General Electric that an agency relationship existed in point of fact,8 
no one has ever doubted that a manufacturer may control the price 
charged by his consignees when there is a bona fide agency. 
No doubt was expressed, that is, until early spring of this year 
when Mr. Justice Douglas in Simpson v. Union Oil9 not only 
questioned, but appears to have denied, the right of a consignor to 
set the price at which his goods are sold by his duly appointed agents. 
Rather than overruling General Electric expressly, however, Mr. 
Justice Douglas chose to limit it to its special facts, emphasizing 
that the consignment considered in that case covered a patented 
product,10 a distinction correctly termed "specious" by Mr. Justice 
Stewart in dissent.11 
7. "The owner of an article, patented or otherwise, is not violating the common 
law, or the Anti-Trust law, by seeking to dispose of his article directly to the 
consumer and fixing the price by which his agents transfer the title from him directly 
to such consumer." Id. at 488. 
8. See, e.g., Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintenance (pts. 1-2), 28 CoLUM. L. 
R.Ev. 312, 441 (1928). 
9. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), six-to-three, Mr. Justice Stewart 
dissenting and Justices Brennan and Goldberg voting to remand for a plenary trial on 
all issues. 
10. "[T]he ratio decidendi of the General Electric case," according to Mr. Justice 
Douglas, was that "the patent laws •.• are in pari materia with the antitrust laws 
and modify them pro tanto." Id. at 24. Thus, "the Court in that case particularly 
relied on the fact that patent rights have long included licenses 'to make, use and vend' 
the patented article 'for any royalty or upon any condition the performance of which 
is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is 
entitled to secure.' [272 U.S.] ... at 489 .... Long prior to the General Electric case, 
price fixing in the marketing of patented articles had been condoned •.• , provided it 
did not extend to sales by purchasers of the patented articles.'' Simpson Union Oil Co., 
377 U.S. at 23-24. 
11. Id. at 27 (dissenting opinion): "[U]ntil today no one has ever considered this 
fact [of the patent] relevant to the holding in that case .... [T]he Court, throughout 
that portion of its opinion dealing with the validity of General Electric's consignment 
agreements, gave no intimation whatsoever that its conclusion would have differed in 
any respect if the consigned article had been unpatented.'' Id. at 27-28. Mr. Justice 
Stewart went on to observe that "possession of patent rights on the article allegedly 
consigned has no legal significance to an inquiry directed to ascertaining whether the 
burdens, risks, and rights of ownership actually remain with the principal or have 
passed to his agent. Nor is the power of a consignor to fix the prices at which his 
consignee sells augmented in any respect by the possession of a patent on the goods 
so consigned. It is not by virtue of a patent monopoly that a bona fide consignor may 
control the price at which his consignee sells; his control over price flows from the 
simple fact that the owner of goods, so long as he remains the owner, has the un-
questioned right to determine the price at which he will sell them.'' Id. at 29. In this 
regard, Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out that "the quotations in the majority opinion 
from the General Electric case relate to a wholly separate second issue involved in that 
case-the validity of a license granted by General Electric to Westinghouse, under the 
patents owned by the former, to manufacture and sell lamps at prices fixed by the 
patentee-licensor-and have no relevance whatsoever to the issue here.'' Id. at 29 n.2. 
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Simpson's essential facts were these: In conjunction with renew-
able one-year leases on its retail outlets, Union Oil entered into 
consignment agreements with its lessee dealers, under which it con-
trolled the retail price and retained title to and paid all property 
taxes on the consigned gasoline until it was sold. The dealer, on the 
other hand, received a guaranteed commission from Union, was 
obliged to carry personal liability and property damage insurance, 
was responsible for any ordinary losses of consigned gasoline, and 
paid his own costs of operation.12 Similar agreements were made 
with non-lessee dealers. In 1956, Simpson entered into such an agree-
ment with Union. Two years later, in an effort to meet compe-
tition,13 he refused to abide by the Company's price policy and 
instead sold gasoline at two cents below the stipulated price. Upon 
the expiration of Simpson's one-year lease, Union refused to renew, 
the consignment arrangement thereupon ceasing. In Simpson's sub-
sequent suit, both parties filed motions for summary judgment on 
stipulated facts stating that Union's refusal to renew the lease was 
prompted solely by Simpson's failure to adhere to the established 
price.14 The district court granted the Union Oil Company's 
motion;111 the court of appeals affirmed.16 
Mr. Justice Douglas, observing that "by reason of the lease and 
'consignment' agreement dealers are coercively laced into an arrange-
ment under which their supplier is able to impose noncompetitive 
. prices on thousands of persons whose prices otherwise might be 
competitive,"17 held, in reliance on Parke, Davis,18 that "resale price 
maintenance through the present, coercive type of 'consignment' 
agreement is illegal under the antitrust laws .... "19 
As noted by Justices Stewart,20 Brennan, and Goldberg,21 consign-
ment arrangements are widely used throughout the economy. Approx-
imately one-sixth of the total volume of the nation's wholesale trade 
is carried on by independent brokers and agents who never acquire 
title to the goods they sell,22 and three and one-half per cent of such 
12. Id. at 14-15. 
13. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 1963). 
14. Ibid. 
15. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. ,r 69936 (N.D. Cal. 1960). 
16. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963). 
17. 377 U.S. at 21. 
18. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
19. 377 U.S. at 24. 
20. Id. at 30. 
21. Id. at 31. 
22. See BECKMAN, ENGLE & BUZZELL, WHOLESALING 101, 219-20 (3d ed. 1959). 
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trade28 is accounted for by commission merchants or consignees.2' 
At the retail level, consignment merchandising is also used exten-
sively, 25 predominantly in the distribution of styled, expensive or 
unique goods, or new products for which the initial demand may be 
uncertain.26 Despite some disadvantages, such as increased capital 
investment costs, greater administrative, managerial, and operating 
expenses, larger risks of loss and therefore higher insurance charges, 
and the impact of the obligation to accept returned goods, consign-
ment merchandising has much to commend its use.27 It assures ade-
quate stocking of a line of products when buyers are unwilling to 
assume the risk of nonsale or are inadequately capitalized. It also 
avoids for the seller serious credit risks in situations where a dealer's 
financial condition is doubtful. And, since the seller retains the 
burdens and responsibilities of ownership, he will exercise a greater 
measure of control over the merchandising of his products. Indeed, 
the principal motivation for distribution through agents is the 
ability to exercise such control.28 
There is a puzzling schizophrenic quality to the Court's opinion 
in Simpson. The breadth of language of certain passages implies 
total condemnation of the consignment device whenever the con-
signee's price is fixed by the seller;29 there are, however, other pas-
23. Id. at 101, 224. 
24. Consigness are especially active in the agricultural sector if our economy. See 
BECKMAN, ENGLE &: BUZZELL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 225-26; PHILLIPS &: DUNCAN, 
MARKETING-PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 423-24 (4th ed. 1960); Klaus, supra note 8, at 
326-29 &: n.39. In the manufacturing area, they operate less extensively, concentrating 
primarily in piece goods, lumber and millwork, and industrial supplies. See BECKMAN, 
ENGLE &: BUZZELL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 225. 
25. Consignment merchandising has been employed in the distribution of such 
diverse items as magazines, newspapers, student books, electrical appliances, tires, 
fertilizer, bread, electrical conduit, plumbing piping, and even caskets. See, e.g., FTC v. 
Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923); Torres v. International Gen. Elec., S.A., 303 
F.2d 615 (1st Cir. 1962); Armour &: Co. v. Celie, 294 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1961); Students 
Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 
U.S. 988 (1956); United States Rubber Co. v. Pulliam, d/b/ a Pulliam Tire Service, 151 
F. Supp. 491 (W .D. Ark. 1957); American Agricultural Chem. Co. v. Barnes Co., 28 
F. Supp. 73 (E.D.S.C. 1939); McCARTHY, BASIC MARKETING, A MANAGERIAL APPROACH 
661 (1960); MARKETING HANDBOOK 208 (Nystrom ed. 1948). 
26. See, e.g., Bendix Home Appliances, Inc. v. Radio Accessories Co., 129 F.2d 177 
(8th Cir. 1942); United States Fid. &: Guar. Co. v. Slifkin, 200 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ala. 
1961); Klaus, supra note 8, at 330-31. 
27. See, e.g., LAzo &: CORBIN, MANAGEMENT IN MARKETING 370-71 (1961); NYSTROM, 
op. cit. supra note 25, at 208-09; Klaus, supra note 8, at 330-31; Note, 43 IowA L. REv. 
603, 605-06 (1958). See also DUNCAN &: PHILLIPS, RETAILING-PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 339 
(6th ed. 1963) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages to the retailer. 
28. See, e.g., McCARTHY, op. cit. supra note 25, at 661; NYSTROM, op. cit. supra 
note 25, at 208; WEISS, MERCHANDISING FOR TOMORROW 356 (1961). 
29. "If the 'consignment' agreement achieves resale price maintenance in violation 
of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are being used to injure interstate commerce ••• ," 
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sages that flatly sustain consignment selling under conditions that are 
not fully elucidated.80 No comprehensible principle is articulated 
that would divide the sheep from the goats. The result is quite 
baffling, and one can only speculate as to what is the decisive element 
that tips the scale. 
There is some support for the view that Mr. Justice Douglas re-
garded the particular consignment agreement in suit as a pure 
sham. Thus, at the very outset of the opinion, he characterizes the 
arrangement as "a so-called retail dealer 'consignment' agreement,"31 
and, throughout the opinion, he encloses the word "consignment" in 
quotation marks. He further suggests that there is somehow some-
thing wrong with the fact that "dealers, like Simpson, are inde-
pendent business men [who] ... have all or most of the indicia 
of enterpreneurs, except for price fixing" ;32 and, he goes on to dis-
tinguish the consignment arrangement upheld in General Electric, 
thereby suggesting that the terms of the Union agreement are in-
consistent with a valid agency.33 On the other hand, Mr. Justice 
Douglas concedes that the consignment arrangement in General 
Electric "somewhat parallels the one in the instant case,"34 thus 
377 U.S. at 16. "United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, as explained in Parke, Davis, 
362 U.S., at 37, was a case where there was assumed to be no agreement to maintain 
retail prices. Here we have such an agreement; it is used coercively, and, it promises 
to be equally if not more effective in maintaining gasoline prices than were the Parke, 
Davis techniques in fixing monopoly prices on drugs." 377 U.S. at 17. "The evil of this 
resale price maintenance program ... is its inexorable potentiality for an even certainty 
in destroying competition in retail sales of gasoline by these nominal 'consignees' who 
are in reality small struggling competitors seeking retail gas customers." Id. at 21. "To 
allow Union Oil to achieve price fixing in this vast distribution system through this 
'consignment' device would be to make legality for antitrust purposes tum on clever 
draftsmanship." Id. at 24. 
30. "One who sends a rug or a painting or other work of art to a merchant or a 
gallery for sale at a minimum price can, of course, hold the consignee to the bargain." 
Id. at 18. "[Aln owner of an article may send it to a dealer who may in tum undertake 
to sell it only at a price determined by the owner. There is nothing illegal about that 
arrangement." Id. at 21. (Emphasis added.) 
31. Id. at 14. (Emphasis added.) 
32. Id. at 20. As he explains, "Their return is affected by the rise and fall in the 
market price, their commissions declining as retail prices drop. Practically the only 
power they have to be wholly independent businessmen, whose service depends on their 
own initiative and enterprise, is taken from them by the proviso that they must sell 
their gasoline at prices fixed by Union Oil." Id. at 20-21. 
33. Id. at 23 n.10. As Mr. Justice Stewart notes in dissent, "The Court implies that 
the terms of this agreement providing that the consignee must carry personal liability 
and property damage insurance; that the consignee is responsible for losses of consigned 
gasoline incurred in the ordinary course of events; and that the consignee must pay 
his own costs of operation, are inconsistent with a valid consignment agreement. But 
such provisions are common to consignment agreements." Id. at 26-27 n.l. 
34. Id. at 22-23. (Emphasis added.) 
64 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:59 
implying that a true agency did exist.35 Moreover, he tells us that "a 
consignment, no matter how lawful it might be as a matter of 
private contract law, must give way before the federal antitrust 
policy."86 It is thus impossible to dispose of the case on the ground 
that the consignment was fictitious and, therefore, within the purview 
of Miles Medical and Standard-Magrane. Had the Court clearly de-
cided that Union's consignment scheme was not a true agency, and 
had Mr. Justice Douglas articulated his reasons for such a finding, 
the Court would at least have provided the business community 
with guidance as to what indicia of ownership may be vested in a 
consignee without destroying his status as an agent. No one would 
quarrel with the proposition that the existence of a free agency is a 
sine qua non to price control by the consignor. 
Nor can one conclude that the Court intended to outlaw all 
consignment arrangements, even if they include price limitations, 
since Mr. Justice Douglas frankly observes that "consignments per-
form an important function in trade and commerce"37 and specif-
ically notes that many courts, including the Supreme Court itself, 
have upheld their legality.38 Yet, Union's consignment agreements 
with more than three thousand dealers are said to be unlawful.39 
One thing is clear. The Court does not invalidate the consign-
ment arrangement because of any horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, 
as it did in Masonite40 or as the Federal Trade Commission ruled in 
Sun Oil.41 Nor does Mr. Justice Douglas purport to outlaw the con-
signment system, as in the Commission's decision in the Atlantic 
Refining case,42 on the ground that it was used only "at irregular 
intervals and in certain markets during price wars" and was not the 
regular method by which the company sold its products.43 Quite to 
the contrary, Union's program had been in effect for close to a 
decade and was its regular method of doing business.44 
Many times in his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas characterizes 
the consignment as "coercive." But he never pauses to explain 
35. See id. at 26 (dissenting opinion). 
36. Id. at 18. 
37. Id. at 17. 
38. Ibid., citing Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522 (1913). 
39. Union had consignment agreements with 1,978 (99%) lessee dealers and 1,327 
(63%) nonlessee dealers. 377 U.S. at 15 n.l. 
40. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). 
41. Sun Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,418 (FTC, May 15, 1963). 
42. Atlantic Ref. Co., TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,422 (FTC, May 16, 1963). 
43. Id. at p. 21289. 
44. "Union put its 'consignment' program into effect in 1955, as a permanent 
measure." 311 F.2d at 766. 
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how he reaches this conclusion or to indicate the sense in which 
this term is used. He speaks of dealers having been deprived of 
"the exercise of free judgment whether to become consignees at all, 
or remain consignees,"45 but the court of appeals emphasized that 
Simpson was completely aware of Union's consignment policy and 
had entered into the arrangement as a "result of his own free and 
deliberate choice."46 The Court refers to no evidence of any com-
pulsion or duress practiced upon Simpson or any other dealer. If 
Mr. Justice Douglas had in mind the disparity of economic power 
between the oil company and its dealers, the fact, of course, is in-
arguable, but the conclusion is a non sequitur. No court has ever pro-
claimed that inequality of bargaining power connotes coercion as a 
matter of law. Any such ruling would cast an ominous shadow over 
countless commercial arrangements. 
Reference is made in the opinion to Union's use of short-term 
leases allegedly "to police the retail prices charged by the consignees, 
renewals not being made if the conditions prescribed by the com-
pany are not met."47 The Court asserts that dealers were "coercively 
laced" into a price-fixing arrangement "by reason of the lease and 
'consignment' agreement,"48 and it voices alarm at the possibility 
that "a supplier could regiment thousands of otherwise competitive 
dealers in resale price maintenance programs merely by fear of non-
renewal of short-term leases."49 That short-term leases can be em-
ployed as an in terrorem device is undeniable; but whether they 
have been so misused is a matter of proof. In Simpson there was no 
such proof. There are many good business reasons for short-term 
leases and contracts. There is no rational basis for ascribing coercion 
to the naked fact that the assignment and its accompanying lease are 
of limited duration. The highest Court, with its immense powers, 
can by sheer fiat stigmatize even the most innocuous arrangement as 
unlawful, but it cannot repeal the laws of logic or alter the meaning 
of the English language. That the shortness of the term of the dealer 
lease is but a makeweight is irrefutably attested by the blanket con-
demnation of Union's agreements with 1,327 non-lease consignees.50 
In affixing its label of coerciveness to Union's consignments, the 
Court nowhere differentiates between lessee and non-lessee dealers. 
45. '!,77 U.S. at 16. 
46. '!,11 F.2d at 769. 
47. '!,77 U.S. at 14-15. 
48. Id. at 21. 
49. Id. at 17. 
50. See id. at 15 n.l. 
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Another crucial fact to Mr. Justice Douglas is that the consign-
ment arrangement was "used to cover a vast gasoline distribution 
system, fixing prices through many retail outlets."51 In such cir-
cumstances, the Court avows, "the antitrust laws prevent calling the 
'consignment' an agency."52 Is the Court suggesting that a single 
consignment is lawful, but a plurality is not? How many agreements 
are necessary to constitute a "vast system"? The Court's reliance on 
numerology would be more comprehensible if it took the public into 
its confidence and disclosed the controlling principles of that enig-
matic science. Should not the policy postulates that persuade the 
Court to regard the "vast" nature of the system as a decisive element 
be articulated so that their validity can be intelligently weighed? And 
should not the guide-lines be explicitly delineated so that business-
men would know when consignments are and when they are not 
permissible? It is noteworthy that in General Electric the fact that 
the challenged arrangement involved four hundred wholesalers and 
2 I thousand or more retailers was not considered significant, the 
Court expressly affirming the legality of the consignment agreements 
"however comprehensive as a mass or whole in their effect .... "53 
I believe all of us will say "amen" to Mr. Justice Stewart's state-
ment that this "upsetting decision carries with it the most severe 
consequences to a large sector of the private economy ... [and] 
inject[s] severe uncertainty into commercial relationships estab-
lished in reliance upon a decision of this Court explicitly validating 
this method of distribution."54 This uncertainty is compounded by 
the Court's curious assertion in conclusion that it was reserving the 
question "whether, when all the facts are known, there may be any 
equities that would warrant only prospective application in damage 
suits of the rule governing price fixing by the 'consignment' device 
which we.announce today."55 It is difficult to fathom the precise 
implications of this statement. In determining whether damages 
should be awarded, what facts does the Court hope to ascertain that 
it has not already considered in declaring the illegality of the consign-
51. Id. at 21. (Emphasis added.) 
52. Id. at 21. 
53. 272 U.S. at 488. It is hardly feasible to confine a merchandising policy to a single 
outlet; if the policy is sound, it will be applicable to most, if not all outlets; indeed, it 
might be discriminatory for it to not be generally available. Furthermore, most con-
signees are individual businessmen. Consequently, if widespread use of a bona fide con-
signment agreement is inconsonant with antitrust requirements, this method of distribu-
tion cannot, as a practical matter, be employed. 
54. 377 U.S. at 29-30 (dissenting opinion). 
55. Id. at 25. (Emphasis added.) 
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ment arrangement itself? Why did it not defer condemning consign-
ment as a matter of substantive law until it had all the relevant facts? 
Why did it not return the case for trial, as the dissenters urged,156 to 
determine whether in fact there had been coercion? Moreover, what 
equities does the Court have in mind? 
No one expects that the Court's resolution of the difficult issues 
litigated will or can satisfy everyone. But is it too much to expect the 
Court not to raise more questions than it answers, not to produce 
more doubt than it allays, not to inject more confusion than it 
dispels, and not to go out of its way to create uncertainty for the 
businessman, his legal adviser, and the lower courts? In a matter of 
such importance as the validity of consignments with price clauses, 
why should one have to speculate as to whether the Court intends 
to forbid them entirely or to permit them under limited conditions; 
and, if the latter, why should one have to be in the dark as to what 
those conditions may be? 
II. MERGERS 
Since the very beginning of antitrust, our merger jurisprudence 
has been unstable, obscure, and confused. In the first Sherman Act 
case to come before it, the Supreme Court sustained stock acquisi-
tions that had resulted in ninety-eight per cent control of an industry; 
the decision, to be sure, rested on jurisdictional grounds and was not 
on the merits.157 Within a decade, however, the Court abandoned its 
unsound jurisdictional conceptions and invalidated the combina-
tion of two major competing transcontinental carriers, without re-
quiring any proof of monopoly power or predatory conduct.158 These 
were the initial antipodes. Thereafter, our merger doctrines fluc-
tuated with each decision.159 In a comprehensive study made more 
than three decades ago, I stated my conclusions in these words: 
"The ... opinions of the Supreme Court are singularly free 
of enlightenment .... [They] are ... inconsistent and ... hope-
lessly confused ... [and] marked by a disheartening lack of can-
dor .... Conflicting theories, divergent explanations of the facts 
56. Id. at 31, 32. 
57. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see HANDLER, A STUDY OF 
THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 46-47 (TNEC 
Monograph No. 38, 1941); Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 
COLUM. L. REv. 179, 184-86 (1932). 
58. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); see HANDLER, op. cit. 
supra note 57, at 47-49; Handler, supra note 57, at 187-9!1. 
59. See Handler, supra note 57. 
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and opposing contentions form an impenetrable jungle of 
words."60 
That was in 1932. 
Whatever else the legislative reform of 195061 may have accom-
plished, it did not expel uncertainty and confusion from our merger 
law. In 1953, when I first discussed the Celler-Kefauver Act in these 
annual reviews, I predicted that "it will take years of litigation be-
fore the bar will have any glimmering of what is the practical mean-
ing of the statute."62 And in 1954 I said that "the last word is that 
of the Supreme Court which alone can authoritatively draw the 
lines."63 
During the initial years of litigation under the Celler-Kefauver 
Act of 1950, the Federal Trade Commission and the lower courts were 
as sharply divided as the commentators.64 In the Commission, the 
initial rejection of mechanical formulae in Pillsbury, 65 Scott Paper 
1,66 and Brillo 167 was superseded by the more doctrinaire approach 
of Reynolds Metals68 and Union Carbide.69 In the courts, the statute 
was read one way in Bethlehem Steel7° and Crown Zellerbach71 and 
quite the opposite way in Columbia Pictures72 and American Crystal 
Sugar.73 
60. Id. at 183, 271. 
61. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 14, pt. I, at 533 (1949); 
Handler &: Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Geller-Kefauver Antimerger 
Act, 61 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 629, 652-64 (1961). 
62. Handler, Recent Developments in the .Antitrust Field 39 (1953) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
63. Handler, Monopolies, Mergers and Markets-A New Focus, in TRADE REGULA• 
TION SYMPOSIUM 17, 36 (1955). 
64. See, e.g., Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 115-28 (1955); STAFF OF ANTI• 
TRUST SUBCOMM., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84rn CONG,, 1ST SESS., INTERIM 
REPORT ON ANTITRUST LAw (Comm. Print 1955); Barnes, Quantitative Substantiality, 
8 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REPORT 11 (1956); Celler, Corporation Mergers and Anti-
trust Laws, 7 MERCER L. REv. 267 (1956); Gwynne, The Federal Trade Commission and 
Section 7, 1 ANTITRUST BuLL. 523 (1956); Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the 
Geller-Kefauver Act-A Look at the Record, 7 MERCER L. REv. 279,289 (1956); Handler, 
supra note 63, at 17, 32; Massel, The New Section 7, I ANTITRUST BuLL. 543, 547 (1956); 
Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 176 (1955). 
65. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953). 
66. Scott Paper Co., 55 F.T.C. 2050 (1959). 
67. Brillo Mfg. Co., 54 F.T.C. 1905 (1958). 
68. Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960). 
69. Union Carbide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614 (1961). 
70. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
71. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 
U.S. 937 (1962). 
72. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
73. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d 
Cir. 1958); see also United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 
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Then in 1962 came Brown Shoe,14 in which the Supreme Court 
did provide an authoritative exegesis of the new legislation and 
established guide lines for determining the two major issues in 
merger litigation-the relevant market and the probable competitive 
effects. The debate over the law's proper scope and meaning was now 
concluded. Whether one agreed or disagreed with the Court's pro-
nouncement, it had spoken and that was the end of the matter.75 
Following Brown Shoe, six experienced trial judges conscien-
tiously applied the rules there laid down to the detailed facts before 
them and concluded that the challenged acquisitions were lawful 
under the tests prescribed by the Supreme Court.76 Of the six deci-
sions, the Government chose not to appeal two;77 the remaining four 
were taken to the Supreme Court in the term just concluded and 
were there reversed.78 In addition, a successful appeal was taken by the 
decided after Brown Shoe. Starting in 1953, I have discussed the developments in 
merger jurisprudence in each of these annual reviews. See Handler, Recent Develop-
ments in the Antitrust Field 30-39 (1953) (unpublished manuscript); Handler, Recent 
Antitrust Developments, 9 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 186 (1954); Handler, Annual 
Review of Antitrust Developments, IO REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 332, 334 (1955); Handler, 
Annual Antitrust Review, 11 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 367, 381 (1956); Handler, Annual 
Review of Recent Antitrust Developments, 12 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 415 (1957); 
Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 13 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 417, 436 (1958); 
Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 CoLuM. L. REv. 843 
(1959); Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 15 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 
!162, !175 (1960); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 17 YALE L.J. 75 (1961); 
Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 
411, 427 (1962); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 159, 171 
(1963). 
74. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
75. See Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 REcoRD 
OP N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 433-41 (1962). 
76. See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 159, 171-72 
(1963). Since Brown Shoe, the Federal Trade Commission held acquisitions unlawful 
in eight cases: Consolidated Foods Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 11 16182 (Nov. 15, 1962), 
reversed, Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), petition for 
cert, filed, !13 U.S.L. WEEK !1066 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1964); Luria Bros., TRADE REG. REP. 
1 16299 (Feb. 13, 196!1); Brillo Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. 11 16543 (July 31, 1963); 
Procter 8: Gamble Co., TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16673 (Nov. 26, 1963); Scott Paper Co., 
TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16706 (Dec. 26, 1963); Ekco Products Co., TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16879 
(April 21, 1964); Permanente Cement Co., TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16885 (April 24, 1964); 
Inland Container Corp., TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17012 (July 31, 1964); and the Commission 
has dismissed complaints in four others: Warner Co., TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16405 (May 
15, 1963); Dresser Industries, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16513 (July 24, 1963); National 
Lead Co., TRADE REG. REP. ,I 16513 (July 24, 1963); Kaiser Indus. Corp., TRADE REG. 
REP. 'J 16529 (Aug. 2, 1963). 
77. United States v. Bliss 8: Laughlin, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 1f 70734 (S.D. Cal. 1963); 
United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
78. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 1[ 70571 (D. Utah 1962), 
rev'd, 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 
(N.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 
F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. 
Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 158 (1964). 
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Government from a district court determination that the Lexington 
Bank merger did not violate the Sherman Act.79 The Government 
thus had a perfect score this year in its merger appeals to the highest 
court. 
In determining the metes and bounds of our merger doctriµes, 
we no longer need speculate or indulge in deductive reasoning. We 
now have a body of nine Supreme Court decisions,80 whose girth, 
including majority and dissenting opinions, runs well over 350 pages 
in the United States Reports. Only time will tell whether the bar 
and the lower courts will hereafter be more successful in applying 
this voluminous aggregation of case law to the facts of particular ac• 
quisitions than were the district courts in apprehending the teach-
ings of Brown Shoe. Is it unfair to suggest that some of the comments 
I made in 1932 about the Sherman Act precedents apply to this new 
corpus of merger rulings? 
Rather than weary the reader with a lengthy analysis of the 
Court's recent decisions, I thought that some illumination and 
amusement might be provided if I were to substitute an imaginary 
opinion of the Supreme Court for the detailed review of the cases 
made in my oral presentation. 
SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES 
No. 0000-October Term, 1963 
UNITED STATES, 
Appellant, On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 
v. 
JoE's DELICATESSEN, INc. 
[June 22, 1964] 
Mr. Justice Christopher Columbus Brown delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
In 1951, Joe's Delicatessen, Inc., the second largest food establish-
79. United States v. First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 208 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Ky. 1962), 
rev'd, 376 U.S. 665 (1964). 
80. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States 
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. First Nat'! Bank &: Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); 
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Phil-
adelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294 (1962); Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); 
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); see also United 
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961) (opinion on scope of 
relief). 
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ment at the intersection of K and 21st Streets, N.W., Washington, 
D. C., acquired all the assets of Victor's Meat Market Co., the third 
largest food store at this intersection, in exchange for five hundred 
shares of Joe's stock and the assumption by Joe's of all Victor's 
liabilities. 
Six years later, th'e Department of Justice, encouraged by our 
decision in United States v. du Pont, 353 U.S. 586, and at the sug-
gestion of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, brought this civil action, seeking a judgment that the acqui-
sition violated both the Clayton and Sherman Acts and requesting 
an order of divestiture. Trying the case without a jury, the district 
court concluded on the basis of detailed findings of fact that the 
challenged acquisition was not likely substantially to lessen competi-
tion or to tend to create a monopoly. Accordingly, the complaint 
was dismissed. An appeal was taken under the Expediting Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 29. We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the unique 
problems incident to the application of the antitrust laws to acquisi-
tions in the vital area of retail food distribution in the Nation's 
capital. We reverse the decision of the district court and direct that 
divestiture be promptly accomplished. 
We do not pause to consider the Government's persuasive attack 
upon the district court's findings of fact, since it is well settled that 
on a government appeal in an antitrust case the facts will be deter-
mined by this Court de novo.81 Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure82 is applicable in antitrust cases only where review 
is sought by those charged with violations of law. On such appeals, 
the findings will be set aside only if they are shown, beyond a reason-
able doubt, to be clearly erroneous. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U. S. 294. We turn, therefore, to the threshold question in all 
merger litigation, the delineation of the relevant market. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act declares unlawful all acquisitions 
that have the proscribed anticompetitive effect in "any section of 
the country." The quoted language has been equated by us with 
the appropriate geographic market. The statute's legislative history 
makes it crystal clear that Congress intended the probable economic 
repercussions of a merger to be determined in any area, "defined 
as narrowly or as broadly as the Government chooses to define it." 
81. Footnotes 81-87 are intended to be part of the hypothetical opinion. United 
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). But see United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 
U.S. 326 (1952). 
82. "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." 
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Cf. Harlan, ]., concurring in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. at 368. To be faithful to the congressional command, we must 
"recognize meaningful competition where it is found to exist." 
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 at 449. 
The district court, misconstruing our decision in Brown Shoe, 
defined the geographic market as embracing the area within a one-
mile radius of the intersection in question. Having incorrectly de-
termined the geographical market, it inevitably reached the errone-
ous conclusion that there was no reasonable probability of any anti-
competitive effect in that broad market. 
To be sure, we held in Brown Shoe that "shoe stores in the out-
skirts of cities compete effectively with stores in central downtown 
areas," 370 U.S. at 338-39, and that the environs of a city had to be 
included within the same market. Our reason was that Congress had 
"prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of the 
relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one." Id. at 336. As we 
said, "The geographic market selected must ... both 'correspond to 
the commercial realities' of the industry and be economically sig-
nificant." 370 U.S. at 336-37. Indeed, had the market not been so 
broadly defined there, we could not have affirmed the conclusion be-
low that the horizontal feature of the merger was unlawful, in which 
event the congressional purpose to outlaw those mergers that the 
Department of Justice deems socially undesirable would have been 
frustrated. 
We took pains to stress the flexible aspect of markets from a busi-
ness as well as a legal point of view. They vary with each situation 
and rest on commercial realities rather than abstract logical prin-
ciples. For this reason, we recognized that there can be submarkets 
as well as markets. An acquisition that has no adverse effect in a 
submarket might conceivably have an incipient effect on competition 
in the broader market. The converse is equally true. Here the area 
of effective competition includes those food outlets that cater to 
the wants of the residents in the immediate vicinity of K and 21st 
Streets. This is an economic verity. In reaching this conclusion, we 
do no violence to the district court's finding that the one-mile sur-
rounding area constitutes a retail market, since the submarket we 
adopt is "a logical extension of the District Court's findings," United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 at 277 n.4,83 or, at 
83. Our attention has been called to the fact that the Senate Committee rejected 
a suggestion that the word "community" be added to amended § 7. Defendants argue 
that, in light of this rejection, the market cannot be coterminous with a mere neigh-
borhood, as distinguished from a geographical segment of the country. The argument is 
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any rate, a logical contraction thereof. It is an axiom of effective law 
enforcement, which commentators oft overlook,84 that the courts 
cannot disregard the necessities of the prosecutor's case in tailoring 
markets if amended section 7 is not to be reduced to the innocuous 
desuetude that characterized the original 1914 version of the legis-
lation. 815 
The district court found that delicatessen and ordinary meat 
products are distinct lines of commerce and cannot be combined. 
We disagree. As we held in United States v. du Pont, 351 U.S. 377, 
it is improper " 'to require that products be fungible to be con-
sidered in the relevant market.' " United States v. Continental Can 
Co., 378 U.S. at 449. We rejected the concept of fungibility as a 
criterion for defining markets when urged by the government in 
United States v. du Pont, supra, and we can do no less here when 
the same argument is pressed by the defense. 
The decisive test, however phrased, is whether there is mean-
ingful competition between the two types of products. We may not 
disregard the fact known to every housewife that delicatessen and 
ordinary meats are in the sharpest competition for the consumer's 
dollar. The rivalry between delicatessen and meat is "pervasive and 
. . . the area of competitive overlap between these two product 
markets is broad enough to make the position of the individual 
companies within their own industries very relevant to the merger's 
impact within the broader competitive area that embraces both of 
the merging firms' respective industries." United States v. Continen-
tal Can Co., 378 U.S. at 456. We reject here, as we did in Brown 
Shoe, the contention that a product market may be fragmented on 
the basis of price and quality differences. We add that the market 
specious. Congress did not shackle the judiciary in setting the metes and bounds of 
the market; all that it did was to quiet the fears of the opposition that the statute 
might be invoked against economically insignificant local mergers. That is not the 
situation with which we are here confronted. This conclusion is fortified by Webster's 
definition of "section" as "a distinct part of a country, of people, community, class, or 
the like." WE!lSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed., unabr. 1958). 
84. See, e.g., Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 159, 171 
(1963); Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments-1962, 17 R.EcoRD OF 
N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 427 (1962); Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75 (1961); 
Annual Review of Antitrust Development, 15 R.EcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 362, 375 (1960); 
Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 843 (1959); Recent 
Antitrust Developments, Ill R.EcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 417, 436 (1958); Annual Review of 
Recent Antitrust Developments, 12 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 415 (1957). 
85. Cf. KAYSEN &: TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 1!13 (1959); Bok, Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. R.Ev. 226, 308-16, 328 
(1960). Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 43 
VA. L. R.Ev. 489, 521-22 (1957). 
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cannot be segmented in terms of the nature of the goods sold, since 
such fragmentation would be "unrealistic" and an impediment to 
effective enforcement. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 
326. Nutritionally, functionally, and <:;conomically there is no sig-
nificant difference between a piece of salami and a slice of pork. 
A more dramatic example of reasonable interchangeability would 
be difficult to conceive. 
Having established that fresh meat and delicatessen constitute 
a relevant market, it does not follow, of course, that this is the only 
such market. We believe that all food products-vegetables, fruits, 
and groceries as well as meat and delicatessen-also constitute a 
relevant market for purposes of this case. The existence of a sub-
market does not by any means negate the equally significant exist-
ence of a broader market to which it belongs. It cannot be too often 
affirmed that the number of combinations and permutations of 
markets is not prescribed by any mechanical formula, but rather is 
determined by the dynamism of the market place. 
We thus reach the ultimate question of this merger's effect on 
competition in the markets as we have now constructed them. Sec-
tion 7 was enacted to curb "a rising tide of economic concentration 
in the American economy." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. at 315. Although the effect of an acquisition on competition 
was at one time thought not to be "the kind of question which is 
susceptible of a ready and precise answer ... ," United States v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 at 362, we have dispensed "with 
elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable 
anticompetitive effects" and have replaced such archaic requirements 
with a simpler test that eliminates the uncertainty that is the bane 
of the businessman's existence. Id. at 363. Moreover, we must never 
forget that ease of enforcement is integral to the sound administra-
tion of justice. 
This record exhibits the classic instance of the concentration 
with which Congress was concerned. At the crossroads there are four 
food establishments. In addition to Joe's, which handles delicatessen 
only, and Victor's, which purveys fresh meats, there is Gordon's 
Vegetable Store and an A&P Supermarket selling a variety of food 
products, including meat, delicatessen, fruits, vegetables and gro-
ceries. Before the merger, the A&P store had fifty per cent share of 
the overall food market, the remainder being divided twenty per 
cent for Victor's, seventeen per cent for Joe's, and thirteen per cent 
for the vegetable store. Thus, prior to the acquisition, the two mar-
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ket leaders in this oligopolistic structure accounted for seventy per 
cent, whereas after the merger they represented a figure of eighty-
seven per cent. Concentration has thus been increased by more than 
twenty per cent. Whereas before there were four viable competitors, 
there are now only three, a diminution of twenty-five per cent in the 
number of establishments. As we held in United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 at 364-65, "without attempting to 
specify the smallest market share which would still be considered to 
threaten undue concentration, we are clear that 30% presents that 
threat." On the facts presently before us, the creation of a new market 
factor having thirty-seven per cent of an already concentrated market 
is plainly violative of the statute. 
If the percentage figures are refined further to take into account 
the economically meaningful meat-delicatessen submarket, an even 
more alarming result obtains. Prior to the acquisition, Victor's had 
fifty-nine per cent of the meat-delicatessen market at the relevant 
intersection; A&:P twenty-five per cent; and Joe's six.teen per cent. 
Today, the merged company enjoys seventy-five per cent of this 
market, leaving only twenty-five per cent for the A&:P. 
The trial court was unduly impressed by the testimony of some 
one hundred witnesses, consisting of manufacturers, wholesalers, re-
tailers, and consumers of food products to the effect that competi-
tion, far from being lessened, had in fact been strengthened by the 
acquisition. We give no weight to such unreliable testimony. As we 
have already noted, the plain fact is that Congress intended to curb 
concentration in its incipiency and to forbid minor accretions of 
economic power. A horizontal merger, of necessity, eliminates a 
competitor and increases concentration, the twin evils toward 
which this legislation is addressed. It takes more than proof that 
competition was increased to repel the presumption of illegality 
arising from the galloping trend toward concentrated economic 
power disclosed by this record and affirmed by recent congressional 
investigation.86 Were this Court to sustain this acquisition, it 
would trigger a wave of mergers that would soon convert our free 
business system into a cartelized economy. 87 
Nor can we ignore the potential competition between Joe's and 
Victor's that has been foreclosed by this merger. A delicatessen may 
diversify through internal expansion to include fresh meats, and, 
86. See, e.g., the current Senate Antitrust Subcommittee investigation into the con-
centration of economic power, BNA ANTITRUST &: TRADE REG. REP. No. 156, A-13 ijuly 
7, 1964). 
87. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315, 320-21 (1949) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
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conversely, butcher shops often install delicatessen counters. As we 
noted in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 at 174, 
"the existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed 
corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce wait-
ing anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substan-
tial incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated." 
Such competition is completely eliminated by the challenged acqui-
sition. 
In view of our holding, we need not deal with the Government's 
Sherman Act contentions at any length. Suffice it to say that the 
acquisition eliminates competition among major competitive factors 
in the market and, therefore, is governed by our recent decision in 
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665. 
The point is vigorously pressed that this case does not involve the 
fusion of industrial giants of the dimension of du Pont, General 
Motors, Alcoa, Continental Can, and the like. Size, however, is rela-
tive. Percentage command must be appraised in light of the control-
ling market facts. In this market, Joe's Delicatessen is just as dominant 
as are the industrial giants we have mentioned in their respective 
fields of operation. 
We are not impressed by the claim that this is a combination of 
two small businesses. In enacting the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 
it was Congress' purpose to maintain the integrity of the competi-
tive structure of the economy, upon which the preservation of our 
precious democratic way of life hinges. We repeat what we said in 
Brown Shoe: "Section 7 was enacted to prevent even small mergers 
that added to concentration in an industry." 370 U.S. at 345, n.72. 
If America is to remain strong and free, we must execute the con-
gressional mandate of curbing monopoly in its incipiency, no matter 
what our personal predilections may be. Arguments of policy and 
convenience are to be addressed to the Congress. 
A word about the fact that Mr. Victor of Victor's Meat Market 
Co. is getting along in years and has wanted to retire from business. 
The short answer to this is that Victor's is "the prototype of the 
small independent that Congress aimed to preserve by§ 7." United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 at 281. 
The judgment is reversed, and, since there must be divestiture, 
the case is remanded to the district court for the entry of an appro-
priate decree. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Mr. Justice Lucius Quintus Vespucius, dissenting. 
I can do no better in voicing my disagreement with the majority 
than to quote the language of my brethren in registering their dissents 
in other contexts. "I find the Court's decision inconsistent with the 
language of the statute, with its history and background, and with any 
reasonable purpose which can be ascribed to Congress in enacting it." 
White, J., in Costello v. Immigration & Naturalization Sserv., 376 
U.S. 120 at 132. "The Court's opinion ... is unsound logically on its 
face and demonstrably unsound historically." Harlan, J ., in Wesberry 
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. at 22. "The root error ... in the Court's decision 
is that it works an extraordinary and unwarranted departure from ... 
settled principles .... " Brennan, J., in Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 at 319. "I cannot so cavalierly ignore the 
obligations of a court to dispense justice to the litigants before it." 
White, J., in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 at 
456. "The present case . . . will, I think, be marked as the baldest 
attempt by judges in modern times to spin their own philosophy into 
the fabric of the law, in derogation of the will of the legislature." 
Douglas, J., in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 at 628. 
Nor can I improve upon the criticisms of my brothers Stewart 
and Harlan in two of the other merger cases decided at this term, 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 284 and 
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 467, 469-70, 477. 
Writes Mr. Justice Stewart in the former of these cases: 
"The District Court ... did a careful and thoughtful job. It 
applied the proper law, and its reasoning was impeccable. Yet 
this Court overrules its decision with little more than a wave of 
the hand." 377 U.S. at 284. 
Equally pertinent are the observations of Mr. Justice Harlan in 
Continental Can: 
"With all respect, the Court's conclusion is based on erroneous 
analysis, which makes an abrupt and unwise departure from 
established antitrust law. 
"The bizarre result of the Court's approach is that market per-
centages of a non-existent market enable the Court to dispense 
with 'elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior and 
probable anticompetitive effects' . . . . 
* * * 
"I have no idea where § 7 goes from here, nor will businessmen 
or the antitrust bar. Hitherto, it has been thought that the 
validity of a merger was to be tested by examining its effect in 
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identifiable, 'well-defined' (Brown Shoe, supra, 370 U. S. at 
325, 8 L.Ed. 2d at 535) markets. Hereafter, however slight (or 
even nonexistent) the competitive impact of a merger on any 
actual market, businessmen must rest uneasy lest the Court 
create some 'market,' in which the merger presumptively dampens 
competition, out of bits and pieces of real ones. No one could 
say that such a fear is unfounded, since the Court's creative 
powers in this respect are declared to be as extensive as the 
competitive relationships between industries. This is said to 
be recognizing 'meaningful competition where it is found to 
exist.' It is in fact imagining effects on competition where none 
has been shown.'' 
Only two short years ago, in Brown Shoe, we endeavored to lay 
down merger guidelines for the instruction of the lower courts 
and the bar. This good doctrine, carefully considered and formu-
lated, should not now be forsaken. We do not advance the public 
interest by inventing lines of commerce or sections of the country. 
To meet the needs of a dynamic society, our merger jurisprudence 
must be more than a mere numbers game, with the numbers getting 
smaller all the time. I would affirm. 
III. ROBINSON-PATMAN 
A. Injury to Competition 
When the Supreme Court decided Morton Salt88 sixteen years 
ago, there were some who construed it as establishing a rule of auto-
matic illegality applicable to secondary-line (buyer level) price 
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.89 Affirming a Com-
mission ruling that a quantity discount system that favored large 
grocery chains purchasing salt was unlawful under section 2(a), Mr. 
Justice Black stated: 
"It would greatly handicap effective enforcement of the Act to 
require testimony to show that which we believe to be self-
evident, namely, that there is a 'reasonable possibility' that com-
petition may be adversely affected by a practice under which 
manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some customers 
substantially cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors 
of these customers.''90-
88. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). 
89. E.g., FTC, Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pridng Practices, TRADE REG. 
REP. (10th ed.) at pp. 5341-49. "At the other extreme, an injury to competition might be 
discerned in any case in which there was a price difference between competing 
customers, no matter how insignificant the difference nor how unimportant the com-
modity as a part of the business of those concerned." The Commission, however, did 
not adopt this "extreme" view. 
90. 334 U.S. at 50. 
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Only a few years earlier, in the Moss case,91 the Second Circuit 
had held that mere price differences were presumptively injurious 
to competition and that the burden was upon the respondent to 
rebut the existence of such injury. The Federal Trade Commission, 
however, promptly repudiated the Moss rule. In its brief opposing 
certiorari in Moss, the Commission explicitly stated that the statute 
required it "as a part of its affirmative case to present evidence that a 
discrimination may lessen or tend to injure competition."92 This was 
echoed in General Foods J,93 where Commissioner Gwynne em-
phasized: 
"The standard for determining the unlawfulness of an unjusti-
fied price discrimination, namely, the substantiality of the effects 
reasonably probable, is the same whether the competitive injury 
occurs at the seller level or at the customer level. The fact of 
injury is to be determined in all cases by a consideration of all 
the competent and relevant evidence and the inferences which 
may be reasonably drawn therefrom. Under differing circum-
stances the proof necessary to establish injury or even to make 
out a prima fade case will differ.''94 
In recent years, however, the suspicion has arisen that the Com-
mission merely pays lip service to the General Foods doctrine and 
that, in actual practice, in order to establish a violation of section 
2(a) at the buyer level it requires precious little more by way of 
proof than differences in prices charged competing purchasers. The 
Commission, to be sure, has never said that it is applying a per se 
rule, but cases such as Tri-Valley,95 United Biscuit,96 and Borden91 
began to quote the Morton Salt rubric as suggesting a rule of auto-
matic illegality. 
Finally, two years ago, a hearing examiner took the bull by the 
horns in the Shattuck98 case. There the respondent had granted a 
ten per cent discount only to chain store purchasers of its packaged 
candy. Although the examiner could perceive "no evidence of 
91. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. ITC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 
(1945), modified, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946). 
92. Brief for Respondent, p. 8, Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. ITC, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). 
93. General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885 (1954). 
94. Id. at 887. 
95. Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, TRADE REG. REP. ,I 15893 (FTC May 10, 1962), rev'd 
on other grounds, TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) ,r 71059 (9th Cir., March 18, 
1964). 
96. United Biscuit Co., TRADE REG. REP. f 15966 (FTC June 28, 1962), modified on re-
hearing, TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 16799 (Feb. 7, 1964). 
97. The Borden Co., TRADE REG. REP. f 16776 (FTC April 22, 1964). 
98. Frank G. Shattuck Co., TRADE REG. REP. f 16882 (FTC April 22, 1964). 
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actual or probable injury,"99 he felt that he could not dismiss the 
complaint because, as he viewed the Commission's recent secondary-
line decisions: 
"[P]roof of competitive injury is no longer required. The Com-
mission has enunciated a 'per se' standard for judging probable 
injury to competition under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman 
Act."100 
On appeal, however, the examiner was told that he had misunder-
stood the import of the Commission's prior rulings. Expressly dis-
claiming adherence to any rule of per se illegality,101 Chairman 
Dixon dismissed the complaint for failure of proof on the issue of 
injury to competition. To support his conclusion, he pointed to these 
facts: (1) the discriminations did not affect the resale prices of the 
non-favored retailers, because they sold at pre-ticketed prices; (2) 
four of the five non-favored purchasers usually did not take ad-
vantage of a two per cent discount offered by the respondent for 
prompt payment; and (3) there was no showing of any adverse effect 
upon the buyers' profits.102 
· It would be nice to be able to report that the Commission's 
action in Shattuck heralds a reaffirmation of General Foods. But, in 
the same month that Shattuck was decided, the Commission filed 
a petition for certiorari from the Seventh Circuit's Amoco108 
decision that makes the picture murkier than ever. The facts in 
Amoco were these: During the course of a seventeen-day price war 
in the vicinity of Smyrna, Georgia, Amoco had granted discounts 
ranging from three to eleven and one-half cents per gallon to its 
Smyrna dealers. Similar discounts were not granted to dealers in 
neighboring Marietta. When the case was before the Commission, 
Chairman Dixon stated that Morton Salt permitted a finding of 
illegality merely from the existence of these "substantial" discrimina-
tions among dealers who were found to be competitors. But, he 
expressly refrained from bottoming his holding on that theory. 
Instead, he rested his decision upon a finding that sales had been 
diverted from the nonfavored Amoco dealers to thost: receiving the 
discriminatory discounts.104 
99. Frank G. Shattuck Co., TRADE REG. REP. ,I 16112 (FTC Sept. 20, 1962). 
100. Ibid. 
101. TRADE REG. REP. ,I 16882, at p. 21917 (FTC April 22, 1964). 
102. Id. at pp. 21917-18. 
103. American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
954 (1964), reversing TRADE REG. REP. ,i 15961 (FTC June 27, 1962). 
104. American Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. ,i 15961, at p. 20786 (FTC June 27, 1962). 
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that there was 
"a lack of any substantial evidence to support a conclusion that this 
temporary and transient limited economic impact was the result of 
[Amoco's discrimination] ... much less that it constituted a prob-
able threat to the ability of the Marietta dealers to continue in 
competition."105 The failure of proof on the issue of causation re-
ferred to by the court of appeals stemmed from the fact that com-
peting brand stations were also posting lower prices and that they, 
therefore, might well have siphoned off sales from the nonfavored 
Amoco dealers. Having thus disposed of diverted sales as a basis for 
the Commission's decision, the Seventh Circuit was left with Morton 
Salt. On this question, the Court agreed with Commissioner Elman's 
dissent that Morton Salt involved a "classic" case of a "discrimina-
tory 'two-price system'" that was "systematic," continually main-
tained, and gave larger buyers a "built-in, routine and permanent 
price advantage over smaller rivals."106 The case, accordingly, was 
deemed inapplicable to the temporary and sporadic discriminations 
present in Amoco. 
In its petition for certiorari, the Commission argued that its 
finding of diversion (and, therefore, the issue of proximate cause) 
was beside the point, because Morton Salt sanctioned a finding of 
competitive injury from the substantial price differential alone.107 
The Solicitor General, although he urged the Court to grant certio-
rari in order to settle this important question, disassociated himself 
both from the Commission's view of the merits and from its reading 
of Morton Salt.t08 
Since the Supreme Court did not accept this opportunity to 
clarify the meaning of Morton Salt,109 it remains to be seen whether 
the Commission will press its construction of the case in the future. 
Thus far, in the wake of Amoco, it seems to have made a conscious 
effort to predicate its findings of injury to competition upon evi-
105. !125 F.2d at 104. 
106. Id. at 106; TRADE REG. REP. 1j 15961, at p. 20791. 
107. "In short, the Commission believes that if Morton Salt means what it seems to 
say, it was fully warranted in concluding •.. that 'in price discrimination cases in-
volving competition between buyers, the requisite injury to such competition may be 
inferred from a showing that the seller charged one purchaser a higher price for like 
goods than he had charged one or more of the purchaser's competitors and that the 
amount of this discrimination was substantial.' Indeed, under this view it was un-
necessary for the Commission further to consider whether in fact there was any signifi-
cant diversion of business from American's Marietta to its Smyrna dealers.'' Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, p. 14. 
108. Id. at 16. 
109, Certiorari was denied. !177 U.S. 954 (1964). 
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dence in addition to the price differences themselves. Thus, in 
Purolator,11° the Commission went to considerable lengths to demon-
strate the competitive significance of the quantum of the discrimina-
tion in relation to the buyers' low profit margins.111 Similarly, in 
Dayco,112 the Commission stressed the magnitude of the discrimina-
tion in the context of low industry profit margins and the importance 
of cash discounts.113 And, in Universal-Rundle,114 the significant ele-
ment was that the discrimination was sufficiently reflected in resale 
prices to divert business to the favored buyer.1111 
Two years ago, in attempting to distill the essence of injury to 
competition in secondary line cases under the Robinson-Patman 
Act, Frederick M. Rowe observed: 
"Essentially, adverse competitive effects are most likely inferred 
from stable price differentials substantial in amount, in the 
supplier's sales of a standardized product, as between competing 
resellers to the same trade, which are in keen competition, and 
operate on tight profit margins. Conversely, the inference of 
competitive injury from a supplier's price variations is remotest 
when the price spread is minimal, concerns a tailored, special-
ized, or component product, in an industry displaying moderate 
competition and ample profits."116 
The Amoco case further teaches that a discrimination of limited 
duration is not actionable, at least when there is no independent 
evidence pointing to a probable impairment of competition. 
But, the broader and more important lesson of Amoco is to be 
found in its quotation from Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion in Sun 
Oil: 
"In appraising the effects of any price cut or the corresponding 
response to it, both the Federal Trade Commission and the 
courts must make realistic appraisals of relevant competitive 
facts. Invocation of mechanical word formulas cannot be made 
to substitute for adequate probative analysis."117 
If the Commission would heed these words, it would be taking a 
real step forward toward a realistic and constructive administration 
of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
110. Purolator Products, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 11 16877 (FTC April 3, 1964). 
lll. Id. at pp. 21882-84. 
112. Dayco Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 11 17029 (FTC Aug. 5, 1964). 
113. Id. at pp. 22139-40. 
ll4. Universal-Rundle Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 11 16948 (FTC June 12, 1964). 
115. Id. at p. 22007. 
116. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r 181 (1962), 
(Emphasis is the author's.) 
117. 325 F.2d at 106, quoting from 371 U.S. 505, 527. 
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B. Meeting Competition 
Last year,118 I called attention to two serious roadblocks to the 
establishment of the meeting competition defense that the Commis-
sion had constructed in the Forster119 case. The holding was that a 
seller may not invoke the defense to a charge of price discrimination 
unless, prior to meeting competition, he knew both the precise 
amount of the lower competitive price and the identity of the com-
peting bidder. Chairman Dixon saw nothing unreasonable in these 
requirements because, in his view, buyers would understand the 
law's strictures and would provide the necessary information to their 
suppliers upon request.120 Now, the First Circuit121 has found this 
approach wholly impractical. Speaking for a unanimous court, Chief 
Judge Woodbury declared: 
"We may not be in as intimate touch with the ways of commerce 
as the Commission, but we would be naive indeed if we believed 
that buyers would have any great solicitude for the welfare of 
their commercial antagonists, sellers. The seller wants the high-
est price he can get and the buyer wants to buy as cheaply as he 
can, and to achieve their antagonistic ends neither expects the 
other, or can be expected, to lay all his cards face up on the 
table. Battle of wits is the rule. Haggling has even been the 
way of the market place. The Commission's requirement is 
unrealistic. "122 
Harking back to the Supreme Court's observation in Staley123 that 
section 2(b) "does not require the seller to justify price discrimi-
nations by showing that in fact they met a competitive price,"124 but 
that it suffices for the seller to show facts which would lead a 
"reasonable and prudent person" to believe that he was meeting 
competition, the court of appeals remanded the case for application 
of this more flexible test. 
Another of the Commission's pet doctrines implicitly went down 
to defeat in Forster. Consonant with its position that the statute re-
quires an actual offer by a competitor to the seller's customer,125 the 
Commission had held that the section 2(b) defense was unavailable 
118. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 159, 183-87 (196!!). 
119. Forster Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. 11 1624!! (FTC Jan. !l, 196!!), rev'd, 1964 
Trade Cas. 11 71190 (1st Cir. 1964). 
120. TRADE REG. REP. ,I 1624!!, at p. 21087 (FTC Jan. !l, 196!1). 
121. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71190 (1st Cir. 1964). 
122. Id. at pp. 79743-44. 
12!1. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., !124 U.S. 746 (1945). 
124. Id. at 759. 
125. E.g., Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 965 (1959), rev'd, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961), 
rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (196!1). 
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because the respondent's competitor had merely made its lower 
prices generally available to the trade and had not made a specific 
offer to any of the respondent's customers.126 The Commission, in 
other words, would require a seller to stand by and wait until the 
very last second before trying to lock the barn door to prevent the 
theft of his horse. While the First Circuit did not expressly address 
itself to the "actual-offer" issue, it necessarily rejected the Commis-
sion's view of the law when it remanded for further proceedings on 
the meeting competition defense. Since the record was clear that 
Forster's customers did not actually receive competing offers,121 a 
remand would otherwise have been a futile gesture.128 
There seems to be no limit to the Commission's ingenuity in 
devising novel reasons for striking down the meeting competition 
defense. This year witnessed the birth of still another requirement 
in the Callaway129 case. According to Chairman Dixon, the seller's 
products must be "similar in grade and quality"130 to those of the 
competitor whose price he is meeting, because a price reduction to 
meet the price of "inferior goods is in effect an undercutting of the 
latter price" and "cannot be characterized as defensive."131 If all that 
the Chairman meant was that a seller is beating competition if the 
quality of his product is such that it traditionally commands a premi-
um price over his competitor's product and he eliminates the usual 
price differential, this would be old hat.132 But the Chairman meant 
a good deal more, since the rugs of Callaway and its competitors 
customarily sold "at similar price levels."133 To be sure, they may 
have been made of different materials, but this did not make them 
any the less competitive with each other. As Commissioner Elman 
noted in dissent, infusing the like grade and quality concept into 
section 2(b) is unwarranted because a seller "is permitted by 2(b) to 
meet a competitive price, that is, a price on competing products, 
126. TRADE REG. REP. ,r 1624!1, at pp. 21086-87. 
127. Ibid. 
128. The First Circuit appears to have left open the question whether the re-
spondent's lower prices to seventeen customers, in response to its competitor's sales to 
only three accounts, constituted too "violent" a reaction to be compatible with good 
faith. 1964 Trade Cas. at p. 7974!1. 
129. Callaway Mills, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 1f 16800 (FTC Feb. 10, 1964). 
130. Id. at p. 21755. 
131. Ibid. 
132. E.g., Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 237 
(2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929); Anheuser-Busch Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 280 
(1957), rev'd on other grounds, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960). 
133. TRADE REG. REP. 1f 16800, at p. 21755. 
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irrespective of whether those products are of 'like grade and quality,' 
for 2(a) purposes, to his own."134 
Despite a continuation of the Commission's campaign against 
the section 2(b) defense, there was a slight ray of sunshine at the 
Commission level this past year. At long last, a respondent succeeded 
in getting a complaint dismissed on the ground of meeting competi-
tion13~-by showing that it verified each discount by an on-the-spot 
check of competitive prices.186 In sustaining the defense in Conti-
nental Baking, Commissioner Elman emphasized that the "good 
faith" concept is "flexible and pragmatic, not technical or doctri-
naire" ;137 that "rigid rules and inflexible absolutes are especially 
inappropriate in dealing with the 2(b) defense";138 that the applic-
able standard is "simply the standard of the prudent businessman 
responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a situation of 
competitive necessity";139 and that "the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case, not abstract theories or remote conjectures, 
should govern its interpretation and application."140 
If the Commission, in administering the meeting compet1t10n 
defense, would actually practice what Commissioner Elman preaches, 
there would be real cause for rejoicing. But, only a few months after 
Continental Baking, Commissioner Elman found himself in the 
minority in Callaway, with the majority warning that the defense 
should be accepted "only with caution after due deliberation"141 and 
that the respondent should be held to "a strict showing."142 On 
balance, therefore, it would appear that the fight for a meaningful 
meeting competition defense continues to be an uphill battle. 
IV. MISCELLANEOUS DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Conscious Parallelism 
In the early 1950's, one of the most vexing antitrust issues was 
conscious parallelism. Reams were written on this subject in an 
effort to pin down the legal significance of this elusive concept in 
134. Id. at p. 21760 (dissenting opinion). 
135. In fact, two respondents succeeded. Continental Baking Co., TRADE REG. REP. 
1f 16720 (FTC Dec. !II, 1963); Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 16814 
(FTC Feb. 24, 1964). 
136. Continental Baking Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 16720, at p. 21648 (FTC Dec. !11, 
196!1). 
1!17. Id. at p. 21647. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid. 
140. Ibid. 
141. Callaway Mills, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 16800, at p. 21755 (FTC Feb. 10, 1964). 
142. Ibid. 
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the law of conspiracy.143 I contributed my share to the spirited 
discussion.144 Although conscious parallelism was frequently called 
a "doctrine" in those days, no one really knew what it meant. To 
be sure, the words conveyed the idea of several businessmen know-
ingly engaging in similar conduct. But, beyond that, there was a vast 
sea of doubt. 
Did conscious parallelism, as a matter of substantive law, equal 
conspiracy? Or, to put it another way, did it dispense with the need 
to prove an agreement in order to establish a violation of section I 
of the Sherman Act? There were those who thought Mr. Chief 
Justice Stone's opinion in Interstate Circuit145 held precisely that.146 
If conscious parallelism did not go that far substantively, did it 
mean, as a matter of procedural law, that it sufficed to make out 
a prima fade case of conspiracy? In other words, would such proof 
be enough to get to the jury, whose determination, one way or the 
other, would be conclusive? Or was conscious parallelism simply 
admissible circumstantial evidence on the issue of conspiracy, the 
probative weight of which would vary depending on the specific 
business context in which the uniform action occurred?147 
The first of these questions was answered ten years ago by the 
Supreme Court in Theatre Enterprises148-a square holding that 
conscious parallelism is not the substantive equivalent of conspiracy 
and that there must be proof of agreement, express or tacit, in order 
to establish a section 1 violation. Hence, the plaintiff in Theatre 
Enterprises was not entitled to a directed verdict upon a showing 
that each of the defendants refused to grant plaintiff's theatre first 
run films, knowing that the other defendants had also refused to 
do so. A jury verdict for the defendants accordingly was upheld. 
143. E.g., Conant, Consciously Parallel Action in Restraint of Trade, 38 MINN. L. 
REv. 797 (1954); Dunn, Conscious Parallelism Reexamined, 35 B.U.L. REv. 225 (1955); 
Kittelle &: Lamb, Implied Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered Pricing, 15 LAW &: CON• 
TEMP. PROB. 277 (1950); Lasky, The Long Bow of Lucretius, Book IV, Line 817, 43 
CALIF. L. R.Ev. 596 (1955); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 
743 (1950); Note, The Nature of a Sherman Act Conspiracy, 54 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 1108 
(1954); Note, Conscious Parallelism-Fact or Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REv. 679 (1951). 
144. Handler, Anti-Trust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities, 6 RECORD OF 
N.Y.C.B.A. 59, 61 (1951); Handler, Contract, Combination or Conspiracy, 3 ABA ANTI· 
TRUST SECTION REP. 38, 40 (1953); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 9 RECORD OF 
N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 173 (1954); Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 10 
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 332, 342 (1955). 
145. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). 
146. See, e.g., Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 177 
(1947). 
147. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 39-40 (1955); Dunn, supra note 143, 
at 229-243. 
148. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). 
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What Theatre Enterprises did not answer was whether a jury 
verdict for the plaintiff would also have been upheld on the theory 
that conscious parallelism would permit, although not require, a 
finding of conspiracy. Mr. Justice Clark, ·writing for the Court, said 
that "business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from 
which the fact finder may infer agreement."149 On the basis of this 
cryptic observation, at least one district court subsequently ruled 
that proof of conscious parallelism was itself enough to go to the 
jury in a conspiracy case.1150 However, I have always interpreted Mr. 
Justice Clark's reference to "business behavior" as signifying some-
thing more than conscious parallelism, "encompassing a wide variety 
of conduct in addition to uniform action."151 Otherwise, every time 
two or more businessmen acted in the same fashion in response to 
the same economic stimulus they could be charged with conspiracy, 
and their fate would be in the hands of a jury that would be free 
to draw a sinister inference from perfectly natural conduct. 
Nevertheless, since Theatre Enterprises, there has been uncer-
tainty as to the probative significance of conscious parallelism. The 
cases that have actually fastened liability on defendants have in-
volved, in addition to uniform conduct, some circumstance pointing 
in the direction of concerted activity-as, for example, where the 
defendants met,1152 discussed prices,1153 or acted contrary to their 
apparent self-interest.1154 
In the past year, we have had unequivocal pronouncements by 
two courts of appeals that conscious parallelism, in and of itself, is 
insufficient evidence of conspiracy to warrant submission of the case 
to the jury. The First Circuit so held in Winchester Theatre Co. v. 
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,1155 and the Ninth Circuit did like-
wise in Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.156 
Both decisions sustained directed verdicts for the defendants at the 
end of the plaintiff's case. A few quotations will give you their flavor. 
In Winchester Theatre, Judge Aldrich had this to say: 
"The plaintiff must introduce evidence from which the jury 
could reasonably infer concert of action. We have never recog-
149. Id. at 540. 
150. Hathaway Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 18 F.R.D. 283 (D. Conn. 1955). 
151. Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, IO RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 
332, 345 (1955). 
152. Advertising Specialty Nat'l Assn. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1956). 
153. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397, 399-400 (4th Cir. 
1958), aff'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). 
154. Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956). 
155. !124 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1963). 
156. !122 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963). 
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nized conscious parallelism, standing alone, as sufficient to sus-
tain such a finding. . . . 
"If parallel action is compelled by competition in this area, we 
find it difficult to say that such action warrants a finding of an 
illicit agreement."157 
By the same token, in Independent Iron Works, Judge Koelsch 
wrote: 
"The mere fact that two or more of the defendants dealt 
with plaintiff in a substantially similar manner does not support 
an inference of conspiracy, even though each knew that the 
business behavior of another or the others was similar to its 
own .... 
"Similarity of prices in the sale of standardized products such as 
the type of steel involved in this suit will not alone make out a 
prima facie case of collusive price fixing in violation of the 
Sherman Act .... "158 
The clarification furnished by these rulings is that businessmen 
will not have to convince a jury that their consciously uniform action 
was_ the product of individual decision where there are no plus 
factors or other unusual circumstances suggesting collusion. Thus 
there is no easy shortcut in the proof of a conspiracy. At least in 
this branch of antitrust, serious charges of wrongdoing must be 
proved. 
B. Consent Decrees 
The Government must have breathed a sigh of relief when the 
Supreme Court handed down its unanimous opinion in the Ward 
Baking case159 this term. A district court in Florida had entered a 
so-called "consent" judgment at the instance of the defendants in 
a civil antitrust action without the Government's consent.160 In so 
doing, it had issued a narrower decree than that sought by the Gov-
ernment. The court's theory was that a trial was pointless because 
it would not have granted broader relief even if the Government 
had succeeded in proving the allegations of the complaint to the hilt. 
Specifically, the complaint charged price-fixing and allocation of 
business in the sale of bread and rolls to the United States Navy in 
the Jacksonville area. The defendants were willing to take an in-
junction prohibiting not only that precise conduct, but also one 
157. 324 F.2d at 653. 
158. 322 F.2d at 661, 665. 
159. United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964). 
160. Id. at 328-30. 
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that covered all bakery products and all sales to the federal govern-
ment. The Antitrust Division, however, insisted that the decree should 
include a general prohibition against conspiring to fix bakery 
product prices or allocate such business in sales to anybody anywhere. 
The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Goldberg, held that 
the district court could not know whether the additional relief was 
justified unless it held a trial on the merits. The Court reversed and 
remanded for that purpose. "It would be a rare case," declared Mr. 
Justice Goldberg, "where all the facts necessary for a trial court 
to decide whether a disputed item of relief was warranted could be 
determined without an 'opportunity to know the record.' " 161 
This is the position that I took seven years ago when I pointed 
out that "if the Government were powerless to prevent a defendant 
from obtaining a unilateral consent decree, the result would be little 
short of chaotic."162 H<?wever, there is one exception: that is, when 
the Government asks for relief that it is not entitled to receive as 
a matter of law. In such a case, it seems to me, the district court 
should have the power to enter a consent decree over the Govern-
ment's objection without a trial. Brunswick-Balke,163 which I com-
mented upon two years ago,164 is a case in point. There the defendants 
bowed to all of the Government's requests, except that they would 
not admit in the decree that they had violated the Sherman Act, since 
such an admission could be used against them as prima facie evidence 
in a treble damage suit filed by a state agency. The district court 
viewed this request of the Government as "an arbitrary and un-
authorized demand," inconsistent with the purpose of the proviso of 
section 5 of the Clayton Act to encourage consent decrees.165 It is 
interesting to note that the Government did not appeal Brunswick-
Balke, that it has not subsequently pressed for such an admission in 
consent decrees, and that the Supreme Court in Ward Baking ex-
pressly leaves open the question of whether the Government can block 
a consent decree by insistence "upon an adjudication of guilt" where 
"there is agreement on every substantive item of relief."166 The Court 
summarized its ruling in these terms: 
161. Id. at 331. 
162. Handler, Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developments, 12 RECORD OF 
N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 440 (1957). 
16!1. United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 
1962). 
164. Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments-1962, 17 REcoRD 
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 419-22 (1962). 
165. 203 F. Supp. at 662. 
166. 376 U.S. at 3!14. 
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"We decide only that where the Government seeks an item of 
relief to which evidence adduced at trial may show that it is 
entitled, the District Court may not enter a 'consent' judgment 
without the actual consent of the Government."167 
C. Judicial Enforcement of Subpoenas 
Although these annual reviews have been devoted solely to devel-
opments in the field of trade regulation, I find myself this year in 
the somewhat strange position of commenting upon a Supreme 
Court decision that arose under the Internal Revenue Code.168 
Reisman v. Caplin169 concerned the statutory power of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue to enforce a summons for the pro-
duction of documents germane to his investigations. Because the 
statutory scheme of the tax law closely parallels the corresponding 
provisions of sections 9 and IO of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act,170 the Court's ruling may provide illumination concerning the 
enforcement of Commission subpoenas and inquiries, a topic which 
I have previously discussed.171 
In Reisman the Internal Revenue Commissioner issued summonses 
directing the production by accountants of various papers relevant 
to civil and criminal tax proceedings pending against their clients. 
Shortly after the summonses had been served, the plaintiffs, who were 
the taxpayers' attorneys, instituted an action in the federal district 
court for a declaratory judgment and an injunction preventing en-
forcement, claiming attorney-client privilege, work-product protec-
tion, and unconstitutional seizure of confidential documents. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal of the action, 172 
holding that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law because the 
Commissioner's summons could not be enforced absent court order 
and, in any court proceeding, "the witness may challenge the sum-
mons on any appropriate ground."173 
167. Ibid. 
168. !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 7602. 
169. 375 U.S. 440 (1964). 
170. 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1963); 38 Stat. 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 50 
(1963). 
171. Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments-1962, 17 REcoRD 
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 414-19 (1962). 
172. The district court held that petitioners had no standing to sue, that the com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action, and that the papers in question were neither 
the work product of the petitioners nor within the attorney-client privilege. See Reis-
man v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 at 442. The court of appeals affirmed on the theory that 
the suit was one against the United States to which it had not consented. 317 F.2d 123 
(D.C. Cir. 1963). See Reisman v. Caplin, supra at 442-43. 
173. 375 U.S. 440, at 449. 
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Section 7602174 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the 
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to summon taxpayers 
or other witnesses to testify and to produce relevant and material 
documents. Section 9175 of the FTC Act grants the same power to 
the Commission. Should a recipient of a summons or subpoena 
refuse to comply, both statutes afford the same enforcement pro-
cedures. In neither case is the administrative subpoena self-execut-
ing; obedience can be obtained only by court order. In addition, 
both statutes, which are in pari materia, make it a criminal offense 
to "neglect" to appear or to produce subpoenaed documents. 
Mr. Justice Clark's opinion sets to rest once and for all the view 
traditionally taken by Federal Trade Commission counsel that a 
district court must defer to the Commission's administrative ex-
pertise and, in effect, rubber stamp the agency's determination of 
the validity of its own subpoena. The Supreme Court makes explicit 
that which I have always regarded as inarguable176-when a respond-
ent challenges a subpoena and the Commission goes into court, the 
district judge must conduct a de novo hearing on all issues, including 
questions of relevance, privilege, materiality, and burdensomeness. 
In Mr. Justice Clark's words, "Any enforcement action ... would 
be an adversary proceeding affording a judicial determination of 
the challenges to the ... [subpoena] and giving complete protection 
to the witness."177 As he reiterates, "in any of these procedures 
before . . . the district judge . . . the witness may challenge the 
... [subpoena] on any appropriate ground."178 Therefore, the deter-
mination of whether the subpoena shall be heeded by the respondent 
is made, not by the agency, but by the court, exercising all of its 
inherent as well as statutory powers. 
Equally important is the Court's treatment of the Internal 
Revenue Code's criminal provision, which parallels section 10 of 
the FTC Act. Mr. Justice Clark minces no words in disposing of the 
notion that criminal liability automatically attaches to a refusal 
to respond to a subpoena prior to court review. He writes: 
"[T]his statute on its face does not apply where the witness 
appears and interposes good faith challenges to the summons. 
It only prescribes punishment where the witness 'neglects' either 
to appear or to produce .... It is sufficient to say that non-
174. INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, § 7602. 
175. ll8 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958). 
176. Handler, supra note 171, at 418-19. 
177. ll75 U.S. 440, at 446. 
178. Id. at 449. 
92 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 6!1:59 
compliance is not subject to prosecution thereunder when the 
summons is attacked in good faith."179 
In other words, if a respondent raises good faith objections, 
rather than comply with a demand that he considers to be beyond 
the Commission's authority, he has committed no crime and it is 
idle for him to be threatened with criminal prosecution. 
D. Fair Trade 
Despite the fact that in 1936 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of state fair trade legislation under the federal 
due process clause, 180 the courts of twenty-four states in recent years 
have invalidated fair trade statutes as applied to nonsigners under 
the due process and other clauses of their state constitutions.181 As 
I pointed out in last year's review,182 two legislatures-Virginia and 
Ohio-sought to repair the damage done by their courts by adopting 
statutory schemes embodying a new theory for making fair trade 
mandatory on nonsigners.183 Both states substituted for nonsigner 
clauses, whose "tort" theory had been held invalid, a provision 
whereby the purchase of trademarked goods with notice of the manu-
facturer's fair trade prices is deemed, by operation of law, a contract 
to maintain those prices. Thus, instead of imposing liability upon 
a nonsigner as a tortfeasor, the new statutes predicate liability upon 
a theory of implied contract. The highest courts of both states up-
held the new theories of legislation.184 
When the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Hudson 
Distributors,185 opponents of fair trade were encouraged to believe 
that the Court might reconsider its twenty-eight year old ruling in 
Old Dearborn186 and hold the Ohio statute unconstitutional or at least 
179. Id. at 447. 
180. The Pep Boys, Manny, Moe 8c: Jack v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198 (1936) 
(California statute); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 
(1936) (Illinois statute). 
181. See TRADE REG. REP. ,r 6041. The figure in the text is computed by adding 
to the above compilation the holdings of the highest courts of Virginia and Ohio 
that led to the enactment of their new fair trade statutes. See note 183 infra; Union 
Carbide 8c: Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958); 
Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1956). 
182. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 159, 181-82 (1963). 
183. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-8.1-59-8.9 (Cum. Supp. 1964); OHIO REv. CODE §§ 133.27-
.34 (Page 1962). 
184. Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N.E.2d 460 (1963), 
afj'd, 377 U.S. 386 (1964); Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. 367, 117 
S.E.2d 289 (1960), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 4 (1961). 
185. 375 U.S. 938, 939 (1963). 
186. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). 
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hold the McGuire enabling legislation187 inapplicable to an implied 
contract statute, just as Schwegmann188 had held the Miller-Tydings 
Act189 inapplicable to the original fair trade nonsigner clauses. In 
Schwegmann,190 it will be recalled, the Court held that state fair 
trade laws could be applied only to retailers who voluntarily agreed 
to comply with the manufacturer's price restrictions and could not 
be invoked on a tort theory against nonsigners. Mr. Justice Douglas 
read the Miller-Tydings Act as validating only actual contracts to 
maintain resale prices, thus denying to the states the power to hold 
nonsignatories liable in tort in interstate transactions. So too, in H ud-
son, it was argued that the McGuire Act now permits state enforce-
ment of vertical price-fixing by actual contract and in tort, but does 
not authorize imposition of nonsigner liability upon the theory of 
implied contract. 
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion for the Supreme Court in Hud-
son191 came as a vast disappointment to detractors of fair trade. 
Reading the nonsigner provision of the McGuire Act literally, the 
Court held that, as long as there is an actual resale price main-
tenance contract between the manufacturer and some retailer, the 
state may bind nonsigners under any rationale sufficient under state 
law, whether it be tort, implied contract, or any other theory. Since 
such actual contracts existed in Hudson, the Ohio scheme is per-
missible under the McGuire Act. 
In addition, the Court's decision manifestly upholds the constitu-
tionality of the Ohio statute under the fourteenth amendment, thus 
reaffirming Old Dearborn. It is plain that Justice Goldberg could 
not have reached the question of the Ohio statute's validity under 
the McGuire Act without first deciding, albeit inferentially, the 
threshold question under the federal constitution. By refusing to 
give federal due process the same restrictive reading that some state 
courts have given their due process clauses, the Court followed its 
long tradition of abstaining from judicial interference with state 
economic legislation.192 
187. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958). 
188. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). 
189. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). 
190. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Congress 
reacted quickly to overcome the disabling' of state fair trade enforcement brought 
about by Schwegmann. Congress enacted the McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a) (1958), which overruled Schwegmann and specifically exempted nonsigner clauses 
of state fair trade statutes from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. 
191. Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964). 
192. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963), and cases therein 
cited. 
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Although he validated Ohio's implied-contract theory where 
actual contracts were present, Mr. Justice Goldberg left open the 
question whether, if the manufacturer is unable to persuade a single 
buyer to agree to fair trade, the state may still bind all purchasers 
who have notice. This question need not have been reached on the 
facts before the Court, and Mr. Justice Goldberg properly refrained 
from considering it. However, the Court's practical approach, 
stressing the McGuire Act's legislative history which evidences a 
congressional purpose to restore the nonsigner liability invalidated 
by Schwegmann, indicates that the widest latitude will be given the 
states in molding fair trade legislation within the authority granted 
by McGuire. And by refusing to hold the Ohio statute unconstitu-
tional, the Court has clearly indicated that it will give no aid and 
comfort to those who would use the Constitution to invalidate state 
fair trade legislation. The matter is now thrust back into state 
courts and legislative chambers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is customary in the law to speak metaphorically of "The 
.Common Law" or "The Supreme Court." These, however, are not 
monolithic institutions. There have been many Supreme Courts. 
History records that the minority opinion of yesterday has often 
become the majority ruling of today. And so I conclude with the 
encouraging thought that the pressures of our complex society 
inevitably compel the abandonment of those rules that do not serve 
its needs. The doctrines that we criticize will survive only if they 
meet this pragmatic test. This is as it should be. Neither the critic 
nor the highest Court is immune from the judgment of time. Later 
Court will have no hesitancy in discarding doctrines that fail that 
acid test-just as this Court has not hesitated to reject the decisions 
of its predecessors. 
